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INTRODUCTION
Ellen Yaroshefsky*

On November 30, 2000, the Jacob Bums Ethics Center at the
Cardozo Law School sponsored a day-long Symposium, The
Cooperating Witness Conundrum: Is Justice Obtainable? The

Symposium sought to publicly present a wide range of perspectives
about the use of informants and other cooperating witnesses in the
criminal justice system. While the problems associated with
cooperating witnesses are informally discussed within segments of
the bar and bench, this conference sought to broaden the
discussion and explore systemic responses to perceived concerns
about the use of cooperators.
To that end, the Ethics Center brought together state and

federal prosecutors, defense lawyers and jurists, social scientists,
and criminal justice policy experts to openly exchange views about
many aspects of the use of informants and other cooperating
witnesses. The conference included a perspective from the
Canadian justice system and from a renowned research
psychologist, as well as thoughtful commentary by members of the
federal judiciary, state and federal prosecutors, and defense
lawyers.

The conference was organized into three panels: Perspectives
on the Role of Cooperatorsand Informants; Screening for Truth
Telling: Is it Possible?; and Thinking Outside the Box: Proposals

for Change.1 The presentations on each panel were followed by

* Clinical Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Jacob Bums Ethics Center
in the Practice of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I am grateful to all the
participants in the conference and those who assisted in its planning and execution. The
moderators, Raymond Brown, Maureen O'Connor, and Jo Ann Harris were especially
helpful as was Judge Stephen Trott, whose ironic humor spurred us into action. I am
especially grateful to Peter Walsh for his superb organizational skills and painstaking
work.
I The participants for Panel One, Perspectives on the Role of Cooperators and
Informants, were: Steven Skurka, Counsel for the Ontario Crown Attorneys Association
at the Morin Inquiry, Toronto, Ontario; Professor H. Richard Uviller, Columbia
University School of Law; Ellen S. Podgor, Visiting Professor, University of Georgia
School of Law; and Howard M. Shapiro, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. The presenters for
Panel Two, Effective Screening for Truth Telling: Is it Possible? were: Michael R.
Bromwich, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson; Dr. Saul M. Kassin, Professor of
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commentary from noted jurists and lawyers. There was lively
interchange among participants.
In this issue, the Cardozo Law Review presents a number of
the articles from that conference.
This collection includes
numerous proposals to address longstanding concerns about the
reliability and truthfulness of cooperator information.
Certainly a one-day forum could only begin to explore the
issues presented by different kinds of cooperating witnesses in
both state and federal courts in different jurisdictions throughout
the country.2
The conference participants recognized the
distinctions that make for difference while focusing upon the issues
common to all cooperating witnesses.
While, for instance,
jailhouse informants, informants who work with the police and
cooperating witnesses who work with prosecutors each present
distinct problems (with jailhouse informants commonly recognized
as the most troublesome), the recognized distinction is often one
of degree of difference rather than kind.
Similarly, the participants recognized the need to examine the
unique characteristics of state and federal systems in the use of
such informants and cooperating witnesses. In some jurisdictions,
such as New York, state prosecutors believe that the evidentiary
requirement of corroboration for the testimony of accomplices and
the greater sentencing flexibility in state courts causes less of a
problem with informant reliability than in the federal system. On
the other hand, federal prosecutors often claim the nature of the
Psychology, Williams College; Steven M. Cohen, Kronish, Lieb, Weiner & Heilman; and
Professor Bennett L. Gershman, Pace University School of Law. Commentators for Panel
Two were: Shirah Neiman, Deputy United States Attorney, Southern District of New
York; Hon. John F. Keenan, U.S. District Judge, Southern District of New York; and Joel
Cohen, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan. The following presenters participated in Panel
Three, Thinking Outside the Box, Proposals for Change: Hon. Stephen S. Trott, U.S.
Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit; Professor Rory K. Little, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law; Michael S. Ross, Law Offices of Michael S. Ross and
Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; and Hon. Gerard E. Lynch, U.S. District
Judge, Southern District of New York. Commentators for this panel were: Gerald B.
Lefcourt, Esq.; Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York;
and Professor Daniel C. Richman, Fordham University School of Law.
2 The terms "cooperating witness" and "informant" are often used interchangeably.
This is reflected in the articles in this issue as well as in the panel discussion. In general,
the distinction drawn between these categories of cooperators is that "cooperating
witness" refers to defendants or potential defendants who work with prosecutors, while
informants are those persons who work with the police agencies. Jailhouse informants are
persons, other than co-defendants, accomplice co-conspirators, or percipient witnesses
"whose testimony is based upon statements made by the defendant where both the
defendant and the informant are held in the same correctional institution." HON. FRED
KAUFMAN, THE COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY PAUL MORIN 558

(ONTARIO
MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/html/MORIN/morin.htm
2002) [hereinafter MORIN COMMISSION].

1998),

available at

(last visited Mar. 18,
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cases prosecuted, more thorough investigation, and the practice of
corroboration are among the factors that make for a better system
of truth detection. A number of other distinctions include the
differences between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and state
police agencies, written or unwritten guidelines on the use of
informants and cooperators, and the formality of sentencing
schemes.
Despite these distinctions, it is an accepted proposition that
an effective criminal justice system is dependent upon informants
and other cooperators and, with notable exceptions, our criminal
justice systems operate on the premise that there exist sufficient
checks on well-recognized dangers associated with such witnesses.
These professed checks on such dangers include police
training, prosecutorial screening, corroboration requirements in
the state system or corroboration practice in the federal system,
cross-examination (called our engine for truth telling), and
cautionary jury instructions. To the extent that there are instances
where informants or cooperating defendants have been found to
implicate innocent people or embellish the guilt of others, our
system has viewed these as aberrant-as unique and singular
instances that are not representative of a systemic problem.
While the dangers associated with the use of cooperating
witnesses have been well documented,3 the concern about their use
has increased in the last fifteen years because of a number of
changes in the criminal justice system. A common perception is
that these changes have resulted in a sea change in the powers of
prosecutors and police. They include:
(1) expanded federal jurisdiction over crimes once considered
exclusively within the province of the state;
(2) a significant shift in the types of crimes prosecuted in great
measure because of significant funding of the "war on drugs";
(3) mandatory minimum sentences;
(4) sentencing guidelines in state and federal courts; and
(5) in the federal system, a decrease in judicial discretion and
the vesting of greater control over the ultimate sentence to
prosecutors.
The greater stakes for defendants increase the incentives to
cooperate with the government."
3 See, e.g., Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 7-12 (1992); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OH IO ST. L.J. 69, 97
(1995); Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge. Reigning in the Federal
Prosecutor's Expanding Power over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L.
REV. 199 (1997); Christine Saverda, Note, Accomplices in Federal Court. A Case for
Increased Evidentiary Standards,100 YALE L.J. 785,787 (1990).
4 G. Adam Schweickert, III, Comment, Third-Party Cooperation: A Welcome
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There have been a number of calls to study the cooperation
process but there exists little data about the process and its effects.'
There exists a theoretical recognition of the dangers associated
with cooperating witnesses and, over time, scholars, judges, and
lawyers have made numerous proposals to reduce those dangers.
Most of those have gone unheeded. As some have said "our
system is imperfect, not flawed." Notably, our system has yet to
examine cases in which those dangers were realized to determine
the extent to which the process of cooperation was responsible for
wrongful convictions.
Significantly, the government of Ontario, Canada has
conducted such an inquiry.6 Guy Paul Morin, who had been
convicted of the murder of his nine-year old neighbor, was
exonerated by DNA evidence ten years later. In 1996, in addition
to a public apology to Mr. Morin, and compensation to him and his
family, the government of Ontario ordered a public inquiry into
the causes of that miscarriage of justice.7
In the first article' in this Symposium Steven Skurka, the thencounsel to the Crown in the Morin Inquiry, presents an overview
of that extensive inquiry and its recommendations by Fred
Kaufman, former Justice of the Quebec Court of Appeals. 9
Skurka, noting that jailhouse informant testimony played a key
role in the wrongful conviction, presents the numerous "bold and
enlightened" recommendations made in the Kaufman Report
Skurka presents
regarding jailhouse informant testimony.10
Addition to SubstantialAssistance DepartureJurisprudence,30 CONN. L. REV. 1445, 1449
(1998) ("The implementation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory
minimum sentencing has led to a ten-fold increase in cooperation from indicted
individuals."); Justin M. Lungstrum, Note, United States v. Singleton, Bad Law Made in
the Name of Good Cause, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 749, 752, n.37 (1999) (explaining that after
the Sentencing Guidelines, cooperation has increased); Hon. John Gleeson, Supervising
Criminal Investigations: The ProperScope of the Supervisory Power of FederalJudges, 5
J.L. & POL'Y 423, 424 (1997); Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF.
L. REV. 563, 564 (1999).
5 I previously conducted interviews with Assistant United States Attorneys in the
Southern District of New York to examine the extent of perceived problems with
cooperators as well as safeguards and techniques utilized to insure truthfulness. See Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors. Experiences of Truth Telling and
Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 n.9, 18 (1999); see also Linda Drazga Maxfield
& John H. Kramer, Substantial Assistance: An Empirical Yardstick Gauging Equity in
Current Federal Policy and Practice, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, Jan. 1998, at 10
(substantial assistance criteria need further study).
6 See MORIN COMMISSION, supra note 2.
7 Id.
8 See Steven Skurka, A Canadian Perspective on the Role of Cooperators and
Informants, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 759 (2002).
9 See MORIN COMMISSION, supra note 2.
10See Skurka, supra note 8, at 761-63.
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common myths about jailhouse informants that were debunked
during the Morin Commission. Skurka notes that the Kaufman
Report did not recommend outright exclusion of the testimony of
all jailhouse informants but notes the changes in the use of such
informants in the Ontario justice system.11 Many of the findings
and suggestions in the Kaufman Report have resonance for the use
of jailhouse informants in the United States.
Skurka's presentation, part of the Symposium's first panel
presenting diverse issues in the role of cooperators and informants,
is followed by Professor H. Richard Uviller's article on the
prosecution's ability to offer "valuable consideration for helpful
testimony."' 3 Professor Uviller offers his customarily thoughtful
and interesting perspective, and reflects upon the widely discussed
case of United States v. Singleton,4 where a panel of the 10th
Circuit, in a decision that was quickly reversed, held that the
prosecutor's exchange of leniency for testimony of the cooperator
was a violation of 18 USC § 201(c)(2), the bribery statute."
Professor Uviller first makes the modest proposal that the federal
bribery statute be amended to reflect the court's decision that the
prosecution's offer of leniency to cooperators is not a violation of
More significantly, Professor Uviller, noting the
the statute.
inability of the defense to offer any valuable consideration to
witnesses to insure their testimony, argues that the defense should
be entitled to procure judicial immunity from prosecution for such
a witness and that federal judges should be permitted to offer
downward departures in sentencing for witnesses who offer

11See id. at 763-64.
12 Recently, and nearly one year after this Cooperating Witness Symposium took
place, the Manitoba government conducted an inquiry into the wrongful conviction of
Thomas Sophonow. See MANITOBA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE INQUIRY REGARDING
THOMAS SOPHONOW, available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/sophonow (last visited
Mar. 31, 2002). Two decades after his conviction, the Inquiry, in remarkably strong
language, changed the policy toward testimony of jailhouse informants. "The testimony of
in-custody informers is inherently suspect. Therefore, except in the unusual circumstances
permitted by this policy, in-custody informers should not be called to testify on behalf of
the Crown." Id. at app. F.
Among the myths about jailhouse informants that were debunked in the Morin and
Sophonow inquiries are: 1) It is an indicia of reliability if the informant presents
information that only law enforcement and the informant know (demonstrating how
informants are remarkably capable of obtaining otherwise confidential information); 2)
Jailhouse informants do not act of malice; 3) Jailhouse informants are an integral part of
the criminal justice system.
13 H. Richard Uviller, No Sauce for the Gander: Valuable Considerationfor Helpful
Testimony from Tainted Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 771 (2002).
14144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998).
15 See id.
16 See Uviller, supranote 13, at 790-91.
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cooperation to the defense.'7 He proposes amendments to the
federal sentencing guidelines.'8 Professor Uviller presents, for
future discussion, questions such as whether the bribery statute
should be repealed outright and what type of material assistance
the government should be permitted to offer to witnesses. 9
Focusing upon white collar cases, Professor Ellen Podgor
discusses the unique issues associated with cooperation in the
federal system.20 Professor Podgor notes the distinctions between
white collar cooperators and those in other cases. She points to a
number of differences, including the fact that reliability of
cooperators in these contexts is often less suspect because of both
the source and the nature of the criminal activity and the fact that
investigations are often more lengthy than in street crime
contexts.22 She cautions that the level of sophistication of the
actors in this context may "add credence to deception" in the
courtroom.23 Professor Podgor focuses upon the typical cases
wherein both the corporation and their constituencies are targets
of investigation and prosecution. She addresses the difficulties
engendered by such cooperation, noting that "pitting the employer
against the employee" can often interfere with the fiduciary
employment relationship. 4
Of course, each of these articles presume that the informant
or cooperator is known to the prosecution and the defense.
Panelist Howard Shapiro, former counsel to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, notes in his commentary on the first panel that the
most significant problem for the criminal justice system is not the
informants or witnesses who are subject to the adversary system
through discovery, investigation, and cross examination, but those
informants who work exclusively with police, FBI, and other
investigative agencies whose identities are not and never will be
known to the prosecution, and certainly not to the defense. 5
The second panel, Effective Screening for Truth Telling: Is It

Possible, includes a lively and spirited interchange regarding the
ability of lawyers and judges to determine whether cooperators
17 See id. at 791.
18

See id.

19 See id. at 791-93.
20 See Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Cooperators: The Government in EmployerEmployee Relationships,23 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (2002).
21 See id. at 802-07.
2 See id. at 803.
23 Id.
24 See id. at 803-04.
25 See Remarks of Howard Shapiro, at the Cardozo School of Law Symposium, The
Cooperating Witness Conundrum" Is Justice Obtainable? (Nov. 30, 2000) (on file with
author).
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Research
and informants provide truthful information.
psychologist Saul Kassin provides at least a cautionary note for
lawyers and judges who assess truthfulness as a routine matter.
Kassin begins with the stark note from years of social psychology26
work, that "as a general rule people are poor lie detectors.
Kassin describes a number of experiments and case studies that
challenge common assumptions about the behavior of judges and
juries and reports on studies of two critical, interrelated
phenomenon which have a direct, if not disturbing, impact on our
criminal justice system. 7 The first is the inaccurate belief, shared
by most people, that assessment of truth telling is a matter of
common sense. 8 The second is that confidence in the ability to
discern truth telling is very high.29 Kassin describes those studies
and provides data that demonstrates a disturbing notion: the
ability to detect truthfulness is statistically not much more accurate
than the flip of a coin.3" Moreover, those who are most confident
about their truth telling judgments are not necessarily accurate. In
fact, confidence is often indirectly correlated with accuracy. 1
Kassin describes studies to demonstrate that judgments about
truth telling are often made upon wrong assessments about facial
expressions, jittery behavior and other nonverbal cues.32 Kassin
notes that studies establish that while voice may be the most
accurate cue, the difference between a true and false confession
cannot be accurately determined upon verbal or nonverbal
behavior alone, but requires hard data. Kassin's presentation was
the subject of animated discussion among all panelists.
Steven M. Cohen, a former federal prosecutor, reflects upon
his experience in assessing the reliability of cooperators and points
out the difficulties in making such judgments.33 Echoing Kassin's
studies, Cohen describes how common sense notions regarding "lie
detecting ability" often belie reality.34 He points out that
cooperator lies are often very subtle, but nevertheless have
significant impact on cases. Among the suggestions offered is that
prosecutor's offices need to conduct more extensive training to
provide the particular skills necessary to conduct a meaningful
26 See Saul M. Kassin, Human Judges of Truth, Deception, and Credibility: Confident
but Erroneous,23 CARDOZO L. REv. 809,809 (2002).
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See id. at 810.
30 See id. at 809.
31 See id. at 810.
32 See id.
33 Steven M. Cohen, What is True? Perspectivesof a Former Prosecutor,23 CARDOZO
L. REv. 817 (2002).
34 See id. at 822-24.
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debriefing and provide prosecutors with a "better understanding
of the psychological factors at play when people lie."35 Cohen
suggests that prosecutor's offices should record and catalog
instances where cooperators have lied and use this "vast untapped
resource" to gain a better understanding of the causes and
36
frequency of the problem.
Professor Bennett Gershman suggests precautionary
measures for what has been called the "dark" secret of the U.S.
adversary system: improper witness coaching.37 Noting that the
subject has received modest attention when compared with the
perceived significance of the issue, Professor Gershman focuses
upon the unique role of the prosecutor in the system of justice and
the consequent necessity of insuring that prosecutors do not stray
beyond permissible conduct in witness preparation.38 Professor
Gershman reminds us that there is no record of the witness
preparation sessions, and points out the incentives of prosecutors,
both consciously and unconsciously, to shape facts.39 He discusses
noted instances of improper coaching by prosecutors, the cognitive
factors that facilitate improper coaching, and the difficulties in
detecting and preventing coaching."0 He presents thoughtful, if
controversial, remedies for prosecutorial improper coaching,
including a pretrial taint hearing upon a showing of a basis to
believe that a witness's testimony has been improperly influenced
by suggestive or coercive interviewing techniques.41 Professor
Gershman suggests that courts should permit experts in cognitive
psychology to testify regarding how "memory, language, and
communication can produce false, inaccurate, or misleading
testimony. "42 Finally, he recommends that all interviews with
potential trial witnesses should be electronically recorded either by
audio or videotaping.43
In the third article in the truth telling panel, Joel Cohen
recounts, in dramatic first person style, his experience in 1974 in
the State Special Prosecutor's Office attempting to uncover the
truth from a notorious detective, who cooperated to provide
information about widespread illegal behavior by his coworkers in
35 Id. at 825-26.
36 Id. at 826.
37 See Bennett L.

Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors,23 CARDOZO L. REv.

829 (2002).
38 See id.
39 See id. at 848-49.
40 See id. at 847-51.
41 See id. at 859-60.
42 Id. at 860-61.
43 Id. at 861-62.
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an elite unit of the NYC Police Department. 44 With the wisdom of
years of seasoning both as a prosecutor and defense lawyer, Cohen
reflects upon suggested changes in working with cooperators. He
concludes that the most useful change to protect against untruthful
testimony from cooperators is to require that counsel be present
for each and every session with a cooperator.45
Finally, in the Third Panel, Thinking Outside the Box, the

participants presented suggestions for systemic change. Judge
Stephen Trott, who has been a trailblazer in public
acknowledgment of problems associated with using "criminals as
witnesses," provides a practical guide for prosecutors in dealing
with informers, jailhouse snitches, and cooperators.46 With his

considerable experience as a prosecutor and federal judge, Judge
Trott provides tales of prosecutorial mistakes in dealing with
cooperators and guidelines for avoiding such errors. 7 Judge Trott
talks about the dangers for young prosecutors in detecting
truthfulness and the importance of training programs, excellent
supervision, and an office culture that creates receptivity to correct
practices in working with criminal informants.48 Judge Trott
reinforces the notion that the attitude of the office toward insuring
that "justice is done" rather than "getting the bad guys" is a key
toward good practice.
He notes that an important tool in
teaching prosecutors is videotapes to demonstrate how lying
cooperators look truthful."
Professor Rory Little-noting the critical role that
prosecutors play in directing or participating in criminal
investigations, and the lack of ethics rules to guide that practiceproposes fifteen rules to govern the prosecutor's use of criminal
informants. 1 First, Professor Little, correctly points out the
significance of language in talking about informants. He suggests
that we should replace the term "cooperating witness" with
"criminal informant" for those persons who are themselves
44 Joel Cohen, When Prosecutors Prepare Cooperators, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 865
(2002).
45 See id.
46 Judge Trott has previously published a more extensive version of his Symposium
presentation. See Honorable Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warningfor ProsecutorsUsing
Criminals as Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381 (1996).
47 Remarks of Judge Stephen S. Trott, at the Cardozo School of Law Symposium, The
CooperatingWitness Conundrun Is Justice Obtainable?(Nov. 30, 2000) (on file with
author).
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 See id.
5' Remarks of Rory K. Little, at the Cardozo School of Law Symposium, The
Cooperating Witness Conundrun:Is Justice Obtainable? (Nov. 30, 2000) (on file with
author).
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involved in criminal activity and receiving some benefit from the
government. 2
Among the rules Professor Little proposes include: no
prosecution should be instituted on the uncorroborated word of a
criminal informant; no criminal informant may be used for
investigative or testimonial purposes until reliable steps have been
instituted to evaluate the informant's credibility; the prosecutor
must be "reasonably convinced" that the informant has been
truthful; the decision to use the informant is approved through a
group, supervised decision making process; the informant's
relative culpability has been established; deals with more culpable
defendants to "get" less culpable ones should be disfavored;
substantial monetary rewards should be disfavored; no secret deals
should be made with criminal informants; all bargains with such
informants should be revoked if criminal conduct is detected;
criminal informants should be monitored after indictment and any
unapproved misconduct or deceptive behavior should be reported
to the defense. Additional proposals provide a useful set of
guidelines for prosecutors to guide ethical practice."
Michael Ross suggests that the disciplinary system is the
appropriate and necessary forum in which to address problems of
prosecutors inducing or creating false testimony by cooperators. 4
Ross recommends the adoption of safeguards regarding the
proffer process that should be embodied in a prosecutor's ethical
obligations. He first suggests that prosecutors should not be
permitted to tell defendants or their counsel what testimony or
information is expected in order to earn leniency.5 Second, the
prosecution or its agent should be required to take accurate and
intelligible notes of the information proffered by the defendant
and defense counsel and the prosecution must memorialize any
subsequent inconsistency, amendment, or alteration of the facts
provided by that defendant.56 Third, Ross argues that the
prosecution should turn over to defense counsel, in a timely
manner, the notes of any and all proffer sessions. 7 Fourth, he
argues that each prosecutor's office should adopt an internal
supervisory mechanism to ensure that the aforementioned

52 See id.
53

Id.

54 See Michael S. Ross, Thinking Outside the Box: How the Enforcement of Ethical

Rules Can Minimize the Dangers of Prosecutorial Leniency and Immunity Deals, 23
CARDOZO L. REv. 875 (2002).
55 See id. at 884.
56 See id. at 888.
57 See id. at 888-89.
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proposals are followed scrupulously. 8 Finally, Ross argues that
state and local disciplinary authorities "should begin the task they
should have begun years ago-police a practice that would be
unacceptable if taken by lawyers in civil practice."59 Noting the
well-recognized lack of disciplinary action against errant
prosecutors, Ross concludes that the integrity of the process of
obtaining information
from cooperating witnesses is directly tied
6
to the ethical rules. 0
Judge Gerard Lynch provides a significant shift for thinking
about systemic changes to address problems with cooperating
witnesses. First Judge Lynch highlights important interrelated
issues. He recognizes that there is much to learn from social
psychologists about our truth telling abilities.6 He then notes the
fact that we are mistaken in focusing attention on trials as our
truth telling safeguard because there are so few trials in the
criminal justice system. 62 Third, he notes we are similarly mistaken
in assuming that a guilty plea from a defendant means that the
cooperators in that case were truthful.63 Judge Lynch then suggests
that in our current system, prosecutors are de facto administrative
law judges because they decide who is guilty or not, to which
cooperator one should attempt to obtain or force a guilty plea, and
in effect to impose a sentence by virtue of the position taken
regarding sentencing guidelines. 61 Judge Lynch suggests that we
should first publicly recognize the administrative power of
prosecutors to control the process, and then decide whether we
should hold prosecutors accountable for their decisions in the
same manner as other administrators or judges.65

Professor Daniel Richman focuses his attention upon
remedies within the courtroom to insure that the jury learns
truthful information from cooperating witnesses, and to improve
the prosecution's handling of such witnesses. 66 He argues that it is
incumbent upon the system to provide the jury with a deepened
understanding of the cooperation process such that they are better
58 See id. at 889.
59 See id. at 891.
60 See id.
61 Remarks of Judge Gerard E. Lynch, at the Cardozo School of Law Symposium, The
Cooperating Witness Conundrum" Is Justice Obtainable? (Nov. 30, 2000) [hereinafter
Remarks of Judge Lynch] (on file with author); see also Hon. Gerard E. Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Justice,66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998).
62 See Remarks of Judge Lynch, supra note 61.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 See Daniel Richman, Expanding the Evidentiary Framefor Cooperating Witnesses,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 893 (2002).
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informed to adequately make credibility determinations.67 He
carefully assesses the institutional pressures upon prosecutors and
notes that "more information about the cooperator's odyssey from
target to government witness" is useful not only for the jury, but
might improve the prosecution's view of its own function thereby
encouraging more professional behavior.68
Finally, Professor Barry Scheck provides an excellent
summary of the conference and its suggestions.69

His own

groundbreaking work in the field of wrongful convictions is one of
the instances where the criminal justice system has scientific data
that permits some conclusions regarding the nature of the errors.7"
In that field, use of informants and cooperators is repeatedly cited
as one of the top three problems that result in such convictions.
Nevertheless, there has been little momentum to scrutinize use of
informants and cooperators. Hopefully, the proceedings at this
conference will provide some impetus to further exploration of the
proper use of informants and other cooperating witnesses.

67

See id. at 897.

68 Id. at 898.
69

70

Barry Scheck, Closing Remarks, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 899 (2002).
See JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD, & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL

(2000).
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